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The paradox of progressivity 
in low-tax countries:
income tax in Guatemala
Santiago Díaz de Sarralde, Carlos Garcimartín and 
Jesús Ruiz-Huerta
The Kakwani and Reynolds-Smolensky indices are used to analyse 
the consequences of tax reforms in terms of a tax’s progressivity and 
redistributive capacity. Nonetheless, these indices can only serve as a basis 
for normative judgments in reforms where revenue remains constant. As 
this is generally not the case with tax reforms in practice, the Reynolds-
Smolensky index is usually broken down into changes in the average 
tax rate and changes in the Kakwani index. This article argues that this 
procedure has serious disadvantages, especially in countries with low 
levels of tax revenue. To help overcome these problems, a number of 
alternative indicators are proposed based on the traditional indices, to 
make it possible to analyse the redistributive and progressivity effects of 
reforms that generate changes in revenue. These indicators are then used 
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The literature generally analyses a tax reform’s effects 
on progressivity and redistributive capacity through 
variations in the Kakwani (1977) and Reynolds-
Smolensky (1977) indices. Nonetheless, these indices 
may not be appropriate as a basis for normative 
judgments in the case of  tax reforms that involve 
significant changes in revenue. This problem has 
traditionally been overcome in two ways. The first 
consists of comparing the after-tax income distribution 
using generalized concentration curves (generalized 
Lorenz curves); while the second method uses a 
decomposition of  the Reynolds-Smolensky index, 
which splits the variation of the tax’s redistributive 
capacity into a portion caused by changes in the 
average effective rate and another part caused by 
changes in its progressivity. 
Nonetheless, as this article will attempt to show, 
this net separation of the effects of a reform on the 
average rate and progressivity is questionable, because 
a reform that not only increases the redistributive 
capacity of the tax, but also widens the differences 
between the amounts of  tax paid by high- and 
low-income taxpayers, might actually appear to be 
regressive. This problem, if  it exists, is more serious 
in low-tax countries, where levels of evasion are also 
usually high and tax systems are inequitable. As a 
result, the reforms needed to increase public-sector 
funding may not be implemented because they are 
considered regressive, when in fact they could produce 
both a greater income-redistribution capacity and a 
significant difference between the amounts paid by 
high- and low-income taxpayers. In fact, in the specific 
case of Guatemala, one of the lowest-tax countries 
in Latin America, it will be shown how two measures 
that significantly increase income-tax revenue capacity 
may seem regressive if  the traditional indicators are 
used. Nonetheless, this progressivity is merely apparent, 
and possibly contrary to the subjective perception 
that citizens have of progressivity. 
Consequently, other mechanisms need to be 
developed to evaluate tax reforms that generate changes 
in revenue (as they usually do) and to complement the 
information provided by the traditional indicators. To 
that end, two concepts will be used which are indeed 
separable: the tax level and the differences between net 
incomes or tax liabilities. This separation, which will 
be used to designate level and distance effects, aims 
to provide an additional analytical tool for evaluating 
the progressivity and redistributive capacity of tax 
structures that produce different revenue outcomes, 
in each case estimating the individual contributions 
made by the two effects.
Sections II and III of this article describe the main 
weaknesses which, in the authors’ opinion, the indices 
normally used to evaluate this type of reform suffer 
from. Section IV formulates a proposal; and, lastly, 
section V uses the indicators developed to evaluate 




measurement instruments: inequality, 
progressivity and redistribution
Any analysis of  the redistributive effects of  a tax 
reform firstly requires an instrument that summarizes 
the income distribution in the pre-and post-reform 
situations. A widely used tool for this purpose is the 
Lorenz curve (Lx), which provides a standardized 
system for measuring the percentage shares of 
total income received by different proportions of 
the population. The Gini coefficient (Gx), derived 
from the Lorenz curve, is generally used as a single 
synthetic indicator of relative inequality. Graphical 
speaking, this coefficient compares the area between 
the Lorenz curve and the diagonal and the total area 
under the diagonal, expressed mathematically for 
discrete income distributions as: 
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where μ represents average income, xi and xj are the 
incomes of  individuals i and j respectively, and N 
represents the population. The Gini coefficient thus 
expresses the average difference between income 
pairs divided by twice the average income, and can 
take values between zero (absolute equality) and 1 (a 
single person receives the whole of the population’s 
income). As is true of the Lorenz curve, this coefficient 
shows the relative inequality of a set of incomes, but 
not absolute inequality; so it is difficult to interpret 
in welfare terms when two populations have different 
average-income levels. 
Just as these indicators can be used to compare 
different distributions in time and space, they can also 
be reformulated to compare changes in the income 
distribution caused by the tax system. To simplify, 
if  all units of the population with the same income 
are assumed to have exactly the same tax pressure1 
—in other words, the amount of tax paid depends 
only on income— then the distribution of  those 
incomes can be represented using a technique similar 
to that represented in the Lorenz curves, to obtain 
the income concentration curve (Lt) —and related 
concentration coefficient Ct, which is analogous 
to the Gini coefficient. We could also obtain the 
after-tax income concentration curve (Lx-t) and 
its corresponding concentration coefficient (Cx-t) 
(assuming for simplicity that no reordering occurs, 
then Cx-t = Gx-t) (see figure 1).






















where t(xi,j) represents the tax payable by taxpayers i 
and j, and t is the effective average rate. The after-tax 
income concentration coefficient would be: 
1  Following the eclac definition, “tax pressure” is understood to 
mean the ratio of total taxes paid to total household income.
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In the case of a progressive tax, the amounts of 
tax payable depart systematically from proportionality 
with respect to pre-tax income. The fact that tax 
liabilities are more unequally distributed than incomes 
means that the tax liability concentration curve lies 
further from the diagonal than the pre-tax Lorenz 
income curve; in other words, using the normal 
notation, Lx>Lt. As Lx represents not only the Lorenz 
curve for pre-tax income, but also the tax liability 
concentration curve for a proportional tax of equal 
revenue capacity, the gap between the two curves (Lx-
Lt) can be used to measure the departure of the tax 
from proportionality. This is precisely the purpose of 
the Kakwani index of departure from proportionality 
(K), which is widely used in literature, to measure 
twice the area between the Lorenz curve of pre-tax 
income and the tax liability concentration curve. In 
other words, it represents the difference between the 
tax liability concentration coefficient and the Gini 
coefficient of the distribution of pre-tax income:
FIGURE 1
Lorenz income curve and tax-liability and 
net-income concentration curves
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Lx: Pre-tax income concentration curve.
Lx-t: After-tax income concentration curve. 
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 K = Ct – Gx (4)
A progressive tax would also generate changes in 
the income distribution before and after its payment. 
This redistributive effect is normally quantified by 
measuring the distance between the Lorenz curves 
before and after the tax (Lx-t - Lx), since the two curves 
would be the same in the case of a proportional tax. 
The gap between the two can be synthesized using 
the Reynolds-Smolensky index (RS): 
 RS = Gx – Cx-t (5)
Clearly, a tax’s departure from proportionality 
and its redistributive effect are two closely related 
phenomena; the corresponding indices are related 








This shows that the redistributive effect is 
determined by the departure from proportionality 
and the level of the tax. In other words, it depends 
not only on progressivity but also on level.
2  This expression is explained in Lambert (2001, p. 206 and ff).
III
Progressivity, redistribution and tax reforms
The indices described above are those most commonly 
used to analyse the progressivity and income-
redistribution consequences of  tax reforms.3 
Nonetheless, they may not be suitable when analysing 
reforms that involve significant changes in revenue. The 
specific purpose of this article is to develop indicators 
that help overcome some of the disadvantages of 
these indices. 
As noted above, the Lorenz curve compares the 
income distribution with respect to proportionality, 
whereas the Gini coefficient, derived from it, measures 
the sum of the differences between income pairs in 
relation to average income. Both are therefore relative 
comparisons in which proportions matter rather than 
levels. When comparing these indicators in situations 
where levels vary significantly in time or space, most 
studies explicitly admit the shortcomings of these 
instruments when making welfare judgments.4 To 
overcome these problems, developments based on 
the work of Atkinson (1970) and Shorrocks (1983) 
are often used, through the generalized Lorenz curve 
—namely the ordinary Lorenz curve multiplied by 
3  Many empirical studies have been undertaken, both nationally 
and internationally, using those indices.
4  The same is true when the Lorenz curves intersect each other 
(see Lambert, 2001, p. 44 and ff).
average income. This makes it possible to compare 
not just distributions, but also levels, which is more 
appropriate for making a normative assessment of 
changes or differences in the income distribution across 
a wide range of situations, although several cases persist 
in which it is hard to make a welfare judgment.
Nonetheless, there seems to be less reticence 
when evaluating a tax reform, in which Lorenz and 
concentration curves (and their related indices of 
inequality, progressivity and redistribution) are widely 
used to compare pre- and post-reform values, and 
thus infer “normative” consequences of the design of 
the reform based on the differences observed. These 
comparisons and normative judgments are correct if  
total revenue remains unchanged. Otherwise, the fact 
that the reform produces a more progressive outcome 
or greater redistribution, for example, does not in itself  
have any normative content, because the “superiority” 
of a tax’s progressivity or redistributive effect can only 
be justified by comparing it with a proportional tax 
that generates the same revenue.
To overcome this problem, two approaches have 
been used in studies that evaluate tax reforms. The first 
consists of comparing after-tax income distributions 
using generalized Lorenz curves. In our opinion, this 
approach is questionable. Imagine a tax reform that 
leaves the after-tax Lorenz curve unaltered when 
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taxes are reduced. In that case, using generalized 
curves would indicate a welfare improvement. Yet, 
this conclusion is highly debatable, since it assumes 
that public expenditure per se generates less utility 
than private expenditure; and that would be the sole 
reason for the apparent increase in welfare. The effect 
would be similar to that produced by constructing 
Lorenz curves after spending on a specific good. If  
expenditure on this good increases proportionately 
owing to a change in the population’s preferences, 
the generalized curves would indicate that welfare 
had decreased, because there is less income available 
for other goods. Yet, in reality all that has happened 
is that preferences have changed. Moreover, it is 
possible for changes in revenue to be offset by other 
taxes, in which case their effects also need to be taken 
into consideration. Ultimately, a comparison using 
generalized Lorenz curves is justified because the 
income distribution is not the only thing that matters; 
the absolute level of average income is also relevant. 
Nonetheless, this does not seem appropriate in a 
tax reform, since the average pre-tax income of the 
country in question will not necessarily affected by 
the reform, at least in the short run; but if  it is, the 
effect should be made explicit.5
The second approach to evaluating the effects of a 
tax reform that changes revenue uses the decomposition 
of the Reynolds-Smolensky index (RS), mentioned 
in the previous section, separating the variation in 
the tax’s redistributive capacity caused by changes 
in its effective average rate (t/1-t) from the variation 
caused by changes in its progressivity (K). A decrease 
(increase) in the level of the tax owing to a decrease/
increase in t would always have a negative (positive) 
effect on RS when the tax is progressive; and a decrease 
(increase) in progressivity would have the same effect, 
measured by K. Thus, with a reform that lowers t, one 
should only expect that the increase in progressivity 
is sufficient to compensate for the change in the level 
of the tax.
5  A tax cut does not necessarily lead to an immediate economic 
expansion. Moreover is not easy to quantify its repercussion in 
economic contexts in which other variables play a significant role.
This procedure is useful because it seems to permit 
a separate evaluation of what happens in terms of 
revenue level and progressivity, making the trade-off  
“explicit”. It would thus be possible, for example, to 
positively value the increase in progressivity, measured 
through K and attributable to the design of reform, 
while attributing the decrease (or smaller increase) 
in redistribution exclusively to the amount of  the 
tax reduction. 
Nonetheless, in the usual case of tax reforms 
that alter revenue, this separation of responsibilities 
between the design of the reform and the magnitude 
of its revenue effect is incorrect, since the change in 
revenue not only changes the measurement scale but 
also the distribution of tax pressure. Only a tax reform 
that altered all tax liabilities equi-proportionately would 
leave the progressivity indicator (K) invariant, so that 
all of the change in redistributive capacity (RS) could 
be attributed to changes in the tax’s revenue capacity. 
Thus, even though the measurement of progressivity 
is scale-invariant in itself, a change in progressivity 
resulting from a specific reform will ultimately depend 
on the same decisions that change the level of the tax. 




















































it is clear that progressivity is not separable from the 
level of the tax, since the latter affects the former, 
measured by K, through changes in the denominator of 
expression (7), whereas the individual distribution of 
the change in level affects K by altering its numerator. 
Only in the case of an equi-proportional change in all 
tax liabilities would these variations leave the quotient 
unaltered. In other words, level and progressivity are 
not separable concepts when evaluating the design 
of a tax reform and its effects; and using indicators 
derived from them to evaluate tax reforms could lead 
to errors of interpretation. 
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1. Tax reforms and redistribution
Although tax level and progressivity are not separable 
concepts in the sense discussed in the previous section, 
it is possible to separate changes in the tax level and in 
the differences between net incomes or tax liabilities, 
thus making it possible to more appropriately analyse 
tax reforms that cause changes in revenue. This is the 
basic idea underlying the proposal developed in this 
article; and, at this point, it is worth recalling that a 
reform will increase the redistributive effect of a tax if  
the Reynolds-Smolensky index after the change (RS’) 
is greater than it was before. Otherwise, the reform 
will reduce the redistributive effect, if  RS’- RS < 0, 
or be neutral if  RS’= RS. 
The proposal of  this article consists of 
decomposing the change in the Reynolds-Smolensky 
index, to separate changes in the differences between 
net incomes from changes in the average tax rate. In 
other words, starting from the expression: 
 RS RS G x C Gx Cx t x t’ ( ’ ’ ) ( )− = − − −− −  (8)
and, to simplify, assuming that the Gini coefficient 
before and after the reform does not change,6 in other 
words, G’x=Gx, then
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6  In empirical exercises to evaluate tax reforms, the different fiscal 
structures resulting from the reform are generally applied to the 
same income distribution.
Where the superscript (’) represents the value of the 
variable in question after the reform. This expression 
can be broken down as follows:
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To further clarify the meaning of this expression, 
let β represent the rate of  change of  average net 
income after tax; D the sum of the distances between 
net incomes before the reform; and D’ the sum of 
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Thus, equation (11) can be written as
IV 
Evaluating tax reforms: an alternative proposal 
based on level and distance effects
91
thE PARADox of PRoGREssIVIty In LoW-tAx CountRIEs: InCoME tAx In GuAtEMALA  • 
sAntIAGo DíAz DE sARRALDE, CARLos GARCIMARtín AnD JEsús RuIz-huERtA



















1 2 12β µ
 (15)
Consequently, the change in the Reynolds-
Smolensky index would be the sum of what may be 
called a level effect (LE) and a distance effect (DE):
 















( ’)2 12µN t  (17)
The two effects can be interpreted as follows. 
The level effect represents the difference between the 
net income concentration curve before the reform, 
and what it would have been if  the reform had been 
implemented via an equal (positive or negative) 
transfer for all individuals, thus keeping distances 
between net incomes constant. It is important to note 
that, in our analysis, the “level effect” does not refer 
to the redistributive effect of any possible change in 
the tax that alters revenue by a given amount, but 
to that resulting from a change specifically made by 
transferring a lump sum to all taxpayers, for which 
reason it differs from the “average-type effect” present 
in the decomposition of  the Reynolds-Smolensky 
index. Thus, for example, for a tax reduction, the 
graphic representation of  this effect is shown in 
figure 2, where Lx-tn represents the concentration 
curve following that hypothetical reform. 
The distance effect, meanwhile, expresses the 
difference between the concentration curve that would 
exist if  the reform had been implemented through 
equal transfers (positive or negative) for all individuals, 
holding constant the distances between net incomes 
and the concentration curve after the real reform 
(L’x-t) (which, strictly speaking, means evaluating the 
effects of a purely redistributive reform that alters the 
distances between net incomes by the same amount 
as the original reform analysed, but without changing 
revenue). For the case of a reduction in distances, this 
effect is also shown in figure 2.
The advantage of splitting the distributive effect 
into distance and level components, compared to the 
traditional division between level and progressivity, 
is that it makes it possible to clearly identify whether 
each of the factors —changes in the average rate and 
in distances— contributes positively or negatively to 
the change in the redistributive capacity of the tax, 
because it compares distances under a hypothetical 
equal-revenue scenario. Thus, both the level effect 
and the distance effect may be positive (greater 
redistribution) or negative (less redistribution). 
In particular, for the level effect (LE):
If  ∇ t ⇒ β > 0 ⇒ LE > 0 
If  ∆ t ⇒ -1<β <0 ⇒LE < 0
If  β = 0 ⇒ LN = 0
where ∇ t represents a tax reduction, and ∆ t represents 
an increase.
Whereas for the distance effect (ED):
If  D > D’ ⇒ DE > 0
If  D < D’ ⇒ DE < 0
If  D = D’ ⇒ DE = 0
With this decomposition, the effect of changes in 
the tax level is perfectly isolated, which does not happen 
with the traditional breakdown. For example, if  one 
imagines a tax reform that only lowers the average rate 
without altering the distances between individual tax 
FIGURE 2
Tax reform with an increase in redistribution
Level and distance effects
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Lx-t: After-tax income concentration curve (pre-reform)
L’x-t: After-tax income concentration curve (post-reform) 
Lx-tn: Income concentration curve following a reform of equal 
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liabilities, the traditional breakdown might show that: 
(i) the redistributive capacity of the tax has increased; 
and (ii) the reduction in the average rate has contributed 
negatively to that increase; for which reason (iii) the 
increase in progressivity is exclusively responsible for 
the tax’s greater redistributive capacity.
Clearly, however, any increase in progressivity is 
entirely due to the decrease in the average rate; so this 
has made a positive net contribution to redistributive 
capacity, and is in fact the only factor causing it to 
increase. In contrast, the breakdown presented here 
would show that the reduction in the average rate has 
a positive effect on the redistributive capacity of the 
tax and, moreover, is the only factor responsible for 
its increase, whereas the reform would be neutral in 
distance terms.
2. Tax reforms and progressivity
The decomposition applied to redistribution can 
also be done for progressivity, using the Kakwani 
index (K).
 K K C t G x Ct Gx’ ( ’ ’ ) ( )− = − − −  (18)
If, again to simplify, it is assumed that the Gini 
coefficient before and after the reform does not change, 
in other words G’x=Gx, then
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This expression can be rewritten as follows:
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Defining β as the rate of change in the average tax 
rate, and D and D’ as the sum of the distances between 



















































Thus, the variation in the Kakwani index would 
be the sum of the level effect (LE) and the distance 




















In this case, the level effect would represent the 
difference between the tax-liabilities concentration 
curve before the reform, and what it would be if  
the reform had been implemented through an equal 
(positive or negative) transfer for all individuals, 
keeping the distances constant. Figure 3 illustrates 
this effect, for the case of  a hypothetical tax cut, 
where Ltn represents the post-reform tax-liabilities 
concentration curve. The distance effect, in contrast, 
measures the difference between the concentration 
curve that would exist if  the reform had been made 
through equal (positive or negative) transfers for all 
individuals, holding constant the distances between 
tax liabilities and the concentration curve after the real 
reform (L’t). For the case of an increase in distances, 
this effect would also be as shown in figure 3.
Once again, the advantage of this breakdown is 
that it makes it possible to separate the effect caused 
by the average tax level from that corresponding to 
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the differences between tax libilities. In other words, 
whereas the traditional analysis only shows whether 
progressivity has changed, but not whether this is 
caused by the change in the average tax rate or by 
real changes in the differences between individual 
tax liabilities, the decomposition proposed here does 
allow that distinction to be made. Thus, both the level 
effect and the distance affect can take a positive sign 
(positive contribution to progressivity) or a negative 
sign (negative contribution). 
In particular, for the level effect (LE):
If  ∆ t ⇒ β > 0 ⇒ LE < 0 
If  ∇ t ⇒ <β<0 ⇒ LE > 0
If  β = 0 ⇒ LE = 0
where ∇ t represents a tax reduction and ∆ t an 
increase.
Whereas, for the distance effect (ED):
If  D > D’ ⇒ LE < 0
If  D < D’ ⇒ LE > 0
If  D = D’ ⇒ LE = 0
3. Typology of tax reforms
Once the distance and level effects produced by a tax 
reform have been defined, the different tax-reform 
modalities can be classified in terms of those effects. 
In the case of the redistributive capacity of the tax, 
the classification proposed is shown in figure 4.
FIGURE 4 
redistribution. Types of tax reform
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
RS: Reynolds-Smolensky index. 
EE: Distance effect
Using this typology, tax reforms would be classified 
not only in terms of the tax’s redistributive capacity, 
but also by what happens to the distances between 
taxpayers’ net incomes. The following synthetic 
indicator (distance-level redistribution index) can be 







































 component would thus contribute the











value, which would reflect the relative importance of the 
distance effect in the reform. Consequently, according 
to this indicator, reforms would be classified as: 
(i) strong redistributive reform, if  1<IR≤2 (∆RS, 
DE>0)
FIGURE 3
Level and distance effects in progressivity
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Lt: After-tax income concentration curve (pre-reform)
L’t: Tax-liabilities concentration curve after the real reform
Ltn: Tax-liabilities concentration curve following a reform of 
equal revenue effect implemented with a lump sum tax (in 






















DE > 0 Strong redistributive reform
DE < 0 Weak redistributive reform
∆RS
DE > 0 Weak non-redistributive reform
DE < 0 Strong non-redistributive reform
∇RS
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(ii) weak redistributive reform, if  0< IR ≤1 (∆RS, 
DE<0).
(iii) weak non-redistributive reform, if  -2≤ IR <-1 
(∇RS, DE>0)
(iv) strong non-redistributive reform, if  -1≤ IR ≤0 
(∇RS, DE<0)
The analysis in the case of progressivity is similar. 
Here again there would be four possible reform types 
based on the change in the Kakwani index and the sign 
of the distance effect; and the corresponding indicator 
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The meaning and interpretation follow the same 
patterns, but in this case applied to progressivity: 
(i) strong progressive reform, if  1<IK≤2 (∆K, 
DE>0)
(ii) weak progressive reform, if  0< IK ≤1 (∆K, 
DE<0)
(iii) weak regressive reform, if  -2≤ IK <-1 (∇K, 
DE>0)
(iv) strong regressive reform, if  -1≤ IK ≤0 (∇K, 
DE<0)
These indicators enhance the classification of tax 
reforms, augmenting the traditional classifications 
“redistributive” or “progressive” (based on the positive 
or negative value of RS and K) —which are consistent 
with the classical indicators— with the modifiers 
“strong” or “weak” obtained from the contribution 
made by the distance effect in each case. Moreover, 
provided the value of  the indices is standardized 
to the magnitude of  the revenue effects, it will be 
possible to compare tax reforms that have different 
quantitative effects.
4. Tax reform and elements of the tax: effects 
on level and distance
The decomposition of variations in the redistribution 
and progressivity indicators made in the foregoing 
subsections makes it possible to evaluate the effects 
of tax reforms, distinguishing between the amount 
of a tax cut and the effects of the various elements 
of the tax used to implement the reform. Thus, the 
level effect makes it possible to isolate the pure tax 
increase or decrease component, which is the same 
for all tax reforms that affect revenue equally. This 
procedure thus makes it possible to observe the 
differences between the various possible reforms 
that produce the same revenue change —differences 
that will be reflected in the distance effect. By way 
of example, table 1 summarizes the effects of three 
possible income-tax reform measures, where the 
previous tax rate was progressive.
TABLE 1
distance and level effects 
in alternative reforms
1. Deductions from tax liability
Introduction or increase in an equal deduction from tax 
liability for all taxpayers
Progressivity LE > 0
DE = 0
Increase in K




Introduction or increase in an equal deduction for all tax 
payers
Progressivity LE > 0
DE < 0
K 
Redistribution LE > 0
DE< 0
RS
3. Lowering of  tax rates
Lowering of  marginal rates in the tax schedule (irrespective 
of  which rates are reduced)
Progressivity LE > 0
DE < 0
K
Redistribution DE > 0
LE < 0
RS
Source: Prepared by the authors.
LE: Level effect.
DE: Distance effect.
RS: Reynolds-Smolensky index. 
K: Kakwani index. 
The distance effect separately measures a 
variation in the distribution (or progressivity) and has 
normative significance, because it compares two income 
distributions (or two tax structures) in terms of their 
departure from proportionality, holding average net 
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income (or tax revenue) constant. As the level effect 
is constant for a given amount of tax reduction, the 
design of the reform (the instruments used) can be 
evaluated normatively. In relation to the examples given 
in table 1, the design of reform 1 (deductions from tax 
liability) would be neutral in terms of its contribution 
to progressivity and redistribution (ED = 0), whereas 
the design of reforms 2 and 3 (reductions in the base 
and lower tax rates) would be negative (a decrease) in 
terms of the progressivity and redistributive capacity 
of the tax (ED < 0). The valuation of other reform 
alternatives (deductions or reduction in amounts 
that vary according to income levels; alterations to 
the brackets of the tax schedule; a combination of 
increases and decreases in deductions, reductions or 
rates; changes in the calculation of taxable income, 
among others), and the joint effects of combining 
the different measures, is more complex, and the 
corresponding indicators would have to be calculated 
as appropriate.
V
An application to personal income 
tax in Guatemala
Despite efforts made over the last decade to improve 
the administration and design of Guatemala’s fiscal 
policy, the country’s tax take remains one of the lowest 
in Latin America.7 Although nominal tax rates are 
not very different from the Latin American average, a 
high degree of informality, compounded by unequal 
income distributions, narrow tax bases and high levels 
of fraud explain these revenue shortfalls. Personal 
income tax plays a very small part in the Guatemalan 
tax structure,8 whereas corporate and consumption 
taxes are relatively important (see table 2). 
A more detailed analysis of taxation by income 
sources shows that wages (personal income tax on 
wages) contribute revenue equivalent to just 0.13% 
of gdp, or 3.92% of the total revenue raised through 
income tax. This contrasts with the share of wages in 
gdp, which was 30% in 2006 according to the national 
accounts. In other words, only 0.34% of  total gross 
wages paid goes in tax, which is an excessively low 
proportion. Explanations for this low level of revenue 
go beyond the high level of informality and extreme 
inequality prevailing in Guatemala and include the 
legislation defining taxable income and deductible 
expenses. Firstly, incomes received in the form of 
7  Between 2003 and 2008, the tax burden in Latin America and 
the Caribbean as a whole increased from 15.5% to 17.8% of  
gdp, but in Guatemala it dropped from 11.9% to 11.6% of  gdp 
(eclac, 2009).
8  Nonetheless, this is in keeping with most tax systems in Latin 
America, where direct taxation remains weak despite partial 
reforms.
gratifications, bonuses (Bono 14), length-of-service 
payments or pensions (retirement or other) are not 
subject to income tax. Secondly, deductions are 
allowed for life-insurance policies, certain donations, 
medical expenses and, also, a tax credit in respect 
of  vat paid on purchases for up to 12% of  net 
TABLE 2
Guatemala: tax revenue in 2006
(Percentages of gdp)
Direct taxes 2.9
 Income tax 2.1
  Corporate 1.7
  Personal 0.3
 Tax on financial products (corporations) 0.1
 Tax on financial products (individuals) 0.0
 ietaapa 0.8
 Wealth taxes 0.0
Indirect taxes 7.7
 Domestic value added tax 1.9
 Value added tax on imports 3.4
 Customs duties 1.0
 Tax on tobacco and tobacco products 0.1
 Taxes on the distribution of beverages 0.2
 Tax on vehicle circulation 0.1
 Tax on the distribution of oil and petroleum products 0.7
Total tax revenue 11.1
Source: Superintendency of  Tax Administration (sat). 
a Special temporary tax to support the peace accords.
gdp: Gross domestic product.
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income. Lastly, there is a tax-free allowance of 36,000 
quetzales, representing the minimum living wage and 
tax threshold, which, while not particularly high in 
the Central American context (2.03 times per capita 
gdp in 2006), nonetheless contributes to the loss of 
revenue and progressivity.
The taxation of personal capital is broadly based 
despite a clearly dual structure: capital gains pay 
income tax at a 10% rate, interest and other similar 
income pays financial products tax also at 10%, 
whereas dividends are exempt provided they have 
been subjected to tax withholding at source. 
As there is no disaggregated information on taxable 
income and the taxes paid in Guatemala, personal 
income tax in the case of wage earners was analysed 
using data from the National Employment and Income 
Survey (enei) 2004. The database in question was 
adapted to the structure of the tax, making assumptions 
about the basic variables not included in the survey, 
to approximate the baseline scenario (legislation of 
2006) to actual revenue outcomes.9
This replica of the 2006 baseline scenario reveals a 
low-revenue tax concentrated on a very small number 
of actual taxpayers, with little redistributive capacity 
despite its high formal progressivity. The exemption 
threshold is the first factor responsible for this low 
average revenue. Although there are four marginal 
rates: 15%, 20%, 25% and 31% (see table 3), 73% of  
wage earners fall outside the income tax net; and the 
top rate is applied only to very high incomes (16.7 
times per capita gdp). All of this results in a scale of 
rates that is excessively complex in relation to its very 
narrow scope in terms of the income and individuals 
subject to it.
The existence of the vat credit aggravates this 
situation, because after applying it, only 9.65% of  
formal workers pay the tax, all of whom are in the top 
9  Incomes declared in the survey have been grouped in the 
following categories: taxable wage income, exempt wage income, 
pensions, interest, dividends, rental, capital gains, and incomes 
from agricultural and nonagricultural activities. These incomes 
have been adjusted to 2006 prices using the consumer price index, 
except for interest and dividends, where the recipients of such income 
have been imputed their proportional share of the total dividends 
and interest received by households, as reported in the national 
accounts. To calculate the baseline scenario of revenue equal to 
the actual figure, net income spent is estimated from the vat credit 
at 45%. In addition, individuals below the minimum working age 
have been excluded from the database, and all persons lacking an 
employment contract have been classified as “informal”. Lastly, 
the fact that the data were processed at the individual level (more 
appropriate for tax purposes), rather than by households, needs to 
be kept in mind when interpreting the inequality indicators.
decile of the distribution. Moreover, the vat credit 
reduces the amount paid by 62%. A simulation shows 
that the joint effect of the minimum threshold and 
the vat credit is such that eliminating the 31% tax 
rate would make no difference to revenue outcomes 
(no taxpayer would be affected). As a result of all of 
this, progressivity and redistribution indicators reveal 
a highly progressive tax (Kakwani = 0.6136), but one 
that is poorly redistributive (Reynolds-Smolensky = 
0.0072), owing to its low revenue capacity (the effective 
average rate is 1.34%). 
In view of this, and to highlight the shortcomings 
of  traditional redistribution and progressivity 
indicators, this article has proposed two hypothetical 
reforms acting on these two elements of  the tax. 
This first involves altering the minimum threshold. 
Here, it should be noted that the existence of  the 
threshold pursues three basic objectives:10 (i) to set 
the income threshold needed for a minimum living 
wage, exempting all incomes below this level; (ii) to 
reduce the tax burden in line with taxpayers’ economic 
capacity, bearing in mind their family and personal 
circumstances; and (iii) to simplify the tax, both for 
the administration and for citizens, exempting large 
numbers of very low-income taxpayers.
When setting this minimum tax-exempt income 
threshold, reductions in the tax base (such as that 
in force in Guatemala), zero-rated income brackets, 
or tax credits may be equivalent; but the revenue 
cost is much higher in the case of reductions, and 
credits are less visible. Moreover, as the tax saving 
for each taxpayer occurs at his or her top marginal 
rate, the saving rises with income. Accordingly, at 
the international level, there is a trend to replace 
10  See, for example, Zee (2005).
TABLE 3






up to 36 000a 0 1-73 (73%)
36 000 - 65 000 15 74-92 (19%)
65 000 - 180 000 20 93-99 (7%)
180 000 - 295 000 25 100 (1%)
over 295 000 31
Source: Prepared by the authors.
a This amount is deducted from taxable income. 
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reductions in the tax base by zero-rated income 
brackets or credits (oecd, 2006).
In view of  the above, this article argues in 
favour of  transforming the tax-exempt threshold 
into an equal-sized zero-rated bracket. In that case, 
revenue would increase by 21%, and there would be 
an increase in the Reynolds-Smolensky index and 
a fall in the Kakwani index. The interpretation of 
the reform based on these indicators would show 
higher redistributive capacity, but a reduction in 
progressivity, so the increase in redistributive capacity 
would merely be the consequence of a higher average 
rate (see table 4). Accordingly, a reform of this type 
could be criticized because the gain in redistributive 
capacity is merely the outcome of the higher average 
tax rate, whereas the tax is actually becoming less 
progressive. Nonetheless, as shown by the indices 
proposed here, what is really happening is that this 
reduction in progressivity, as measured by the Kakwani 
index, is also an outcome of the higher average rate. 
The level effect, related to the latter, contributes 
negatively to both progressivity and redistributive 
capacity. In contrast, the distance effect is positive, 
which means that not only are the distances between 
net incomes significantly reduced, but the differences 
TABLE 4
Transformation of the minimum threshold 
to a zero-rated bracket
Post reform Pre reform Variation
Revenue (quetzales) 354 348 097 291 670 901 21%
RS 0.0090 0.0072 0.0018
K 0.6119 0.6136 -0.0017
RS K
Level effect -0.0010 -0.1694
Distance effect 0.0028 0.1677
IR 1.7381
IK -1.4975
Source: Prepared by the authors.
RS: Reynolds-Smolensky index.
K: Kakwani index. 
IR: Distance-level redistribution index
IK: Distance-level progressivity index.
TABLE 5 
Abolition of the vat credit
Post reform Pre reform Variation
Revenue (quetzales) 769 134 255 291 670 901 164%
RS 0.0189 0.0072 0.0118
K 0.5502 0.6136 -0.0634
RS K
Level effect -0.0076 -0.5944
Distance effect 0.0194 0.5310
IR 1.7178
IK -1.4718
Source: Prepared by the authors.
RS: Reynolds-Smolensky index.
K: Kakwani index. 
IR: Distance-level redistribution index.
IK: Distance-level progressivity index.
vat: Value added tax.
between the amounts of tax paid by taxpayers grow. 
For that reason, it cannot really be said that the 
reform is regressive; and, if  it was, the subjective 
perception that citizens have of  progressivity would 
be lost. In contrast, the proposal developed in this 
article simulates a specific reform, separating what 
happens to the average rate from what happens to 
the differences between incomes and tax liabilities. 
In this example, where the difference between taxes 
paid by high-income and low-income individuals 
have widened, the indicators proposed would show 
that the reform was strongly redistributive (IR=1.74) 
but weakly regressive (IK=-1.50).
A second simulation involved a reform abolishing 
the vat credit, which would generate a significant 
increase in revenue (164%). Its consequences for the 
redistributive capacity and progressivity of the tax 
would be the same as in the previous measure, namely 
an apparent loss of progressivity, resulting exclusively 
from the higher average rate (negative level effect) (see 
table 5). In contrast, the differences between taxes 
paid by low- and high-income individuals would 
increase (positive distance effect). This reform is 
again strongly redistributive (IR=1,72) and weakly 
regressive (IK=-1,47). 
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This article has attempted to highlight the shortcomings 
of the Kakwani and Reynolds-Smolensky indices for 
analysing the tax-progressivity and redistributive-
capacity effects of tax reforms that produce changes 
in revenue. It has also shown that the traditional 
ways of  overcoming these shortcomings by using 
generalized curves and the decomposition of  the 
Reynolds-Smolensky index into effects caused by 
the average rate and progressivity, are questionable: 
in the first case, because they unjustifiably bias the 
results in favour of tax reductions; and, in the second 
case, because decomposing changes in the Reynolds-
Smolensky index into effects caused by the average 
rate and by progressivity cannot be used to evaluate 
the design of the reforms, since the measurement of 
progressivity is altered in most real reforms by the same 
factors that alter the average tax rate. Consequently, 
indicators have been proposed that make it possible to 
quantify the effects of a tax reform involving changes 
in revenue based on concepts that are separable, namely 
the tax level and differences between net incomes or 
tax liabilities. These indicators make it possible to 
distinguish the effects on a tax’s redistributive capacity 
and progressivity caused by changes in the average 
rate and variations in the differences in individual 
tax liabilities.
The level and distance effects thus developed also 
make it possible to partly recover the intuitive meaning 
of the concept of progressivity and redistribution. 
Deciding “who benefits most” from a tax reform is 
complicated and subject to value judgments. The 
traditional indicators (K, RS, and their respective 
breakdowns) provide a view based on relative 
differences in incomes or tax liabilities, which is very 
useful when making comparisons in a static context 
for reforms that do not cause changes in tax revenue. 
In other situations, the conclusions obtained may 
be counterintuitive. For example, how can a tax be 
made more progressive by a reform that lowers the tax 
liabilities of high-income individuals by much more, 
when they receive most of the tax reduction both in 
absolute and in relative terms? If  this is true, then 
is it “good” to increase progressivity? Put another 
way, if  they were well-informed, would a majority 
of citizens vote for a reform of this type?
As this article has attempted to show, interpreting 
the indicators used to evaluate tax reforms that change 
revenue causes confusion. This article proposes a 
different alternative. The level effect isolates the 
repercussions that a reform would have on income 
shares or tax liabilities between taxpayers (in particular, 
progressivity and redistribution indicators) if  the 
distances between tax liabilities and incomes remain 
constant. The distance effect reflects the consequences 
of a specific reform design (in other words the elements 
of  the tax that are altered) on progressivity and 
redistribution, when the level of revenue and total 
income remains constant. This separation of  the 
effects, and the indicators constructed from it, make 
it possible to nuance and enhance the conclusions 
reached using the classical indicators.
In addition, this alternative breakdown of the 
effects of the tax reform makes it possible to highlight 
the effect of  the change in distances between net 
incomes or between taxes payable, without ceasing 
to use traditional instruments that are based on a 
relative concept of  inequality, which is of  interest 
for two reasons. Firstly, given the explanation of the 
repercussions of a tax reform, public-sector managers 
and citizens may wish to know its consequences in 
absolute terms, and how it affects the distances between 
individual incomes (or tax liabilities). Secondly, the 
decomposition allows for an approach to “relative-
income hypotheses”. Although, strictly speaking, it 
cannot be claimed that the indicators described in this 
paper capture the effect on the relative position of 
taxpayers in the tax-reform scenario, they do reveal 
its aggregate effect on the set of  relative positions 
through the calculation of the variation in distances 
between incomes or tax liabilities.
Lastly, it is worth noting that the problems with 
the traditional indicators discussed throughout this 
article are more serious in the case of low-tax countries. 
A reform that generates the necessary increase in 
the tax system’s revenue capacity will often appear 
to be regressive, according to these indicators; and 
this may be used as an argument to reject the reform. 
Nonetheless, this apparent regressivity is merely the 
consequence of the increase in revenue capacity itself  
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of tax paid by high- and low-income taxpayers. As 
shown in the tax measures analysed for Guatemala, 
the traditional indicators would suggest that the tax 
has become less progressive. Nonetheless, in both 
cases the differences between taxes paid by higher- 
and lower-income individuals have actually widened, 
which seems to contradict the previous conclusion. 
In contrast, this proposal shows clearly that this 
reduction in progressivity is merely the consequence 
of the higher average rate following the reforms, but 
that the cost of the reforms will affect higher-income 
taxpayers more. In our opinion, this information is 
of considerable social interest. 
(Original: Spanish)
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